kenberg, on May 16 2007, 03:45 PM, said:
Larry Cohen was commenting on this while I was watching, confirming what mgoetze says. I found the argument odd, but I guess they know what they are doing.
The argument:
If the absolutely top class pair xy play together, the auction price will be huge. After buying a portion of themselves, they must finish high (LC said seventh, but no doubt it varies) in order to break even financially. So they play with a "stranger", this lowers the price and their risk.
Maybe an economist could comment.
Coincidentally, when i was working on my PhD in Economics, I did a lot of work on Game Theory with a special interest in auctions...
I think that I can offer a (reasonable) explanation for this phenomena. Here's how an economist would treat this type of problem:
Lets assume that we have N people bidding on a hypothetical pair. (Each bidder has infinite resources)
Each person participating in the auction places a value on that pair. Hypothetically, I might believe that the expected value of “Zia – Hamman” is $12,000. Justin might believe that the pair is worth “$11, 500”. Matt believes that the pair is worth “11, 487”, yada, yada, yada. (For the purpose of simplicity, you normally assume that these valuations are generated randomly using some easy to manipulate probability density function (A uniform distribution or whatever)
I believe that that the Cavendish pairs auction is equivalent to a standard voice auction. These auctions have a very simple equilibrium. Whoever places the highest value on the pair ends up purchasing them. The price that they pay is epsilon more than the valuation of the second highest bidder. If we look back to the original example, I would Justin would stop bidding on Zia - Hamman when the purchase price his $11,500. I'd end up buying the pair for $11,500.01
This will (often) lead to a condition known which is known as the “Winner's Curse”. The individual who purchases a given pair is the person who is most likely to have over-estimated the value of that pair. (As always, there is a decent treatment of the winner's curse on the Wikipedia). Please note: Some economists would argue that bidders are smart enough to build a compensation for the winner's curse into their valuations and will adjust their bidding accordingly. Even so, folks can still end up overbidding at times.
The rules of the Cavendish create a perverse incentive for the players:
Players are encouraged (forced) to purchase a percentage of the winning bid. (I assume that this is designed to ensure that they have an incentive to do well). However, the nature of the Winner's curse ensures that they are required to buy a percentage of an over-valued asset. They are (essentially) forced to make a bad investment whose value was based on some liquored up high roller who might be showing off. Furthermore, the amount that they are required to invest is a function of the amount that they sell for. The greater the amount that the sell for, the large the amount that the players need to invest in this over values asset.
Accordingly, players have an incentive to depress the amount of money that they sell for. I can see how this might create an incentive to break-up established partnerships.
One could make the argument that players should be allowed to purchase their “share” at a discount. Hypothetically, Zia and Hamman should be required to purchase a 10% share at 8% of the sales price. (The actually discount would be designed to balance out the expected value of the winner's curse). Alternatively, one could eliminate this entire requirement and increase the size of the session rewards. Either of these adjustments should eliminate the incentives for pairs to deliberately handicap their performance prior to the start of the tournament.
(Cohen made an interesting observation. I had never thought about this before now)